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OPINION OF  THE  COURT 
________________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 William H. Cosby, Jr., appeals the District Court’s 
order unsealing certain documents that reveal damaging 
admissions he made in a 2005 deposition regarding his sexual 
behavior.  There was no stay of that order, and the contents of 
3 
 
the documents received immediate and wide publicity.  While 
the parties dispute whether the District Court properly 
balanced the public and private interests at stake in unsealing 
the documents, we must decide at the outset whether Cosby’s 
appeal has become moot due to the public disclosure of their 
contents.  The Associated Press (the “AP”) argues in favor of 
mootness because resealing the documents after they have 
already become public will have no effect.  Cosby claims this 
is not the case for two primary reasons, as resealing the 
documents would (1) at least slow the dissemination of their 
contents and (2) might affect whether they can be used 
against him in other litigation.  For the reasons that follow, 
we conclude that the appeal is moot.1 
I. BACKGROUND 
 The unsealed documents result from a complaint filed 
by Andrea Constand against Cosby in the District Court in 
March 2005.  Constand alleged that Cosby had drugged and 
sexually assaulted her at his home.  As part of the discovery 
process, Constand’s counsel took Cosby’s deposition and 
questioned him regarding his relationships with other women, 
including whether any of these women had ingested 
Quaaludes prior to a sexual encounter.2  The deposition 
                                              
 1 The District Court had jurisdiction to hear this case 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.  We have jurisdiction to determine if 
this appeal is moot, see White-Squire v. U.S. Postal Service, 
592 F.3d 453, 456 (3d Cir. 2010), but as we conclude that it 
is, we lack jurisdiction to decide the merits of it.  See North 
Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246 (1971) (per curiam). 
 
 2 “‘Quaalude’ is the brand name for the drug 
Methaqualone, a non-barbiturate sedative-hypnotic that is a 
general depressant of the central nervous system.”  Mendoza 
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resulted in discovery disputes and the parties prepared to 
litigate those disputes before the District Court. 
 After a telephone conference with counsel, the Court 
entered an interim order in November 2005 requiring the 
parties to file under seal their discovery motions and any 
supporting documents.  The AP then moved to intervene and 
oppose the sealing order.  The Court denied the motion on the 
ground that the record was not yet sufficient to determine 
whether a permanent seal was warranted.  It ruled that the 
interim sealing order would remain in effect until the parties 
had conducted all necessary depositions in the case, 
whereupon it would determine which documents should 
remain sealed. 
 As the discovery process continued, the parties filed 16 
documents, the ones before us, under the interim sealing 
order.  In certain of them, counsel for Constand and Cosby 
quoted excerpts from the transcript of Cosby’s deposition and 
summarized portions of his testimony.  As a result, the 
documents reveal that Cosby made a number of damaging 
admissions during his deposition, including that he had: (1) 
engaged in extramarital affairs; (2) acquired Quaaludes and 
engaged in sexual relations with a woman after she ingested 
the drug; and (3) given money to one woman and offered 
money to Constand.  
                                                                                                     
v. Secretary, Florida Dept. of Corrections, 761 F.3d 1213, 
1217 n.3 (11th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
As a result, ingesting Quaaludes may render someone 
incapable of consenting to sex.  See Gilardi v. Schroeder, 672 
F. Supp. 1043, 1045 (N.D. Ill. 1986).  Though Quaaludes 
were legally available in the 1960s and 1970s, distribution of 
them is now a federal crime.  Gerald F. Uelmen et al., 1 Drug 
Abuse and the Law Sourcebook § 3:58 (2015 ed.). 
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 Before the District Court could rule on whether the 
documents should remain sealed permanently, Cosby and 
Constand reached a confidential settlement in October 2006, 
and the case was dismissed shortly thereafter.  The interim 
sealing order nonetheless continued in effect and the 
documents remained sealed.  Though in such circumstances 
the District Court’s Local Rule 5.1.5(c) requires that the Clerk 
of Court send a notice to the attorney for the party who 
submitted the sealed documents stating that the documents 
will be unsealed unless an objection is filed,3 eight years 
passed without the Clerk taking any action.   
                                              
 3 Eastern District of Pennsylvania Local Rule of Civil 
Procedure 5.1.5(c) provides: 
 
If a document is still sealed at the conclusion of 
the two-year period and the Court has not 
entered an order continuing its sealed status 
beyond that time, the Clerk of Court shall notify 
the attorney for the party having submitted the 
sealed document at the attorney’s address on the 
docket that the document will be unsealed 
unless the attorney or the submitting party 
advises the Clerk within (60) days that said 
attorney or submitting party objects.  If the 
attorney or submitting party objects to the 
unsealing of the document or if the Clerk’s 
notification is returned unclaimed, the Court 
will make a determination, on a case-by-case 
basis, whether to maintain the document under 
seal, to unseal it, or to require further 
notification. 
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 That changed in December 2014 when the AP 
requested that the Clerk issue such a notice and within weeks 
the Clerk placed a notice on the District Court docket stating 
that the documents would be unsealed within 60 days unless 
an objection was filed.  Cosby’s counsel filed an objection 
and the District Court allowed the AP to intervene and argue 
for lifting the interim sealing order.  The Court then set a 
briefing schedule and heard oral argument.  Cosby did not at 
that time request a stay in the event that the Court ruled 
against him and unsealed the documents. 
 On July 6, 2015, the District Court issued an order that 
the documents be immediately unsealed and accompanied the 
order with a 25-page opinion explaining its reasoning.  In 
order to balance Cosby’s privacy interest against the public 
interest in access to the documents, the Court considered each 
of the factors we set out in Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 
23 F.3d 772 (3d Cir. 1994).  In applying them, however, the 
Court relied on the novel rationale that Cosby had reduced 
privacy interests because he had “donned the mantle of public 
moralist and mounted the proverbial electronic or print soap 
box to volunteer his views on, among other things, 
childrearing, family life, education, and crime.”  While the 
parties extensively debate the propriety of this reasoning in 
their briefs, it attracted little notice at the time in light of the 
consequences of the accompanying order. 
 With no stay and the District Court’s instruction that 
the Clerk unseal the documents “forthwith,” an AP reporter 
discovered that the documents were publicly available and 
downloaded them within minutes of the online posting.  
Though Cosby’s counsel emailed a stay request to the Court 
less than 20 minutes later, it was too late to prevent the media 
from publicizing Cosby’s damaging admissions.  The AP sent 
out a “news alert” reading “Documents: Cosby admitted in 
2005 to getting Quaaludes to give to women he sought sex 
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with.”  Declaration of Maryclaire Dale, ¶ 4, Doc. No. 
003112063414 (Sept. 2, 2015).  Within hours, four more 
news organizations had published stories regarding the 
contents of the documents, and public interest in the story did 
not abate thereafter.  Indeed, allegedly due to a 
misunderstanding of the scope of the Court’s order by a court 
reporting service, The New York Times obtained a full 
transcript of the deposition and published excerpts on its 
website.  In the wake of this publicity, the District Court did 
not rule on Cosby’s stay request, and he filed a notice of 
appeal to this Court. 
 At approximately the same time, Cosby and Constand 
became embroiled in a further dispute in the District Court.  
Each filed a motion for sanctions and injunctive relief, 
alleging breach of the confidential settlement agreement.  The 
dispute ended when Constand and Cosby stipulated to 
dismissal of their motions for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction.   
 While Constand declined to participate in this appeal, 
the AP filed a motion to dismiss it as moot in light of the 
public disclosure of the documents.  Cosby argued that the 
appeal was not moot because we could still order the 
documents resealed.  A motions panel of this Court issued a 
preliminary denial of the motion to dismiss and referred the 
matter to us.4  See Order, Doc. No. 003112118113 (Nov. 2, 
2015).5 
                                              
 4 The denial was preliminary per Rule 10.3.5 of our 
Internal Operating Procedures: 
 
A motion panel may grant a motion to dismiss 
an appeal.  If the motion seeks dismissal for 
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II. MOOTNESS 
 To say that an appeal is moot means that the court 
cannot provide the prevailing party with any relief.  Chafin v. 
Chafin, 133 S. Ct. 1017, 1023 (2013).  If this is true, there is 
no longer a controversy to decide as required by Article III of 
the United States Constitution for the exercise of federal 
judicial power.  See id.  Thus, we lack the ability (that is, 
appellate jurisdiction) to decide it and “the appeal must be 
dismissed.”  Church of Scientology of California v. United 
States, 506 U.S. 9, 12 (1992). 
 As a result, our analysis is “centrally concerned with 
the court’s ability to grant effective relief.”  County of Morris 
v. Nationalist Movement, 273 F.3d 527, 533 (3d Cir. 2001).  
This is ordinarily a low bar, as “when a court can fashion 
some form of meaningful relief, even if it only partially 
redresses the grievances of the prevailing party, the appeal is 
                                                                                                     
lack of jurisdiction or for untimeliness, and the 
panel votes not to grant the motion, the motion 
is referred by order, without decision and 
without prejudice, to the merits panel. 
 
 5 In addition to this litigation, Cosby also has been 
involved in numerous other legal proceedings that involve 
allegations of sexual assault.  These proceedings include civil 
suits by other alleged victims against him, a lawsuit Cosby 
filed against one of his accusers, and a criminal proceeding in 
Montgomery County, Pennsylvania, stemming from the same 
alleged conduct as Constand’s civil suit.  These matters are 
not before us, however, and we are limited to deciding this 
particular appeal from the District Court’s order unsealing the 
documents. 
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not moot.”  In re Continental Airlines, 91 F.3d 553, 558 (3d 
Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in 
original).  While the prospect of partial relief is sufficient to 
defeat mootness, mere speculation “afford[s] no basis for 
finding the existence of a continuing controversy as required 
by Article III.”  Blanciak v. Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 77 F.3d 
690, 700 (3d Cir. 1996) (citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 
371-73 (1976); DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 320 n.5 
(1974)).  However, we may consider any evidence bearing on 
whether the appeal has become moot.  See Clark v. K-Mart 
Corp., 979 F.2d 965, 967 (3d Cir. 1992). 
 While Cosby argues that this appeal is not moot 
because we could provide him with partial relief by ordering 
the documents resealed, his own counsel has indicated that no 
meaningful relief is possible.  In the request for a stay, 
Cosby’s counsel told the District Court that “[o]f course, if 
the documents become public before … his appeal [is] 
decided,” then an appeal “will be pointless.”  App. at 757a.  
Though the documents are public, Cosby now claims that 
resealing them would at least slow their dissemination.  In 
particular, resealing them would prevent the Clerk of the 
District Court from continuing to provide official copies of 
the documents upon request (whether through the online 
PACER system or on paper). 
 We and our sister circuit courts have held that appeals 
seeking to restrain “further dissemination of publicly 
disclosed information” are moot.6  Charles Alan Wright et al., 
                                              
 6 United States v. Smith, 123 F.3d 140 (3d Cir. 1997), 
is not to the contrary.  There, prosecutors published on a 
Government website a sentencing memorandum arguably 
containing secret grand jury information, including the names 
of uncharged accomplices of defendants, in violation of 
10 
 
13C Federal Practice & Procedure § 3533.3.1 & n.35 (3d ed. 
2008) (collecting cases).  In In re Orthopedic Bone Screw 
Products Liability Litigation, 94 F.3d 110 (3d Cir. 1996), the 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) accidentally disclosed 
the data underlying a medical study to the plaintiffs in a 
                                                                                                     
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e).  Id. at 144.  After 
publication, and after the uncharged individuals named in the 
sentencing memorandum complained to the District Court, it 
ordered the Government to remove the memorandum from its 
public website and to attempt to recover copies already 
distributed.  Id. at 144-45.  On appeal, we held that the risk of 
revealing additional, previously undisclosed, grand jury 
secrets justified continuing protective measures.  See id. at 
154.   
 In a dictum, we then rejected the news media’s 
argument that the District Court was “powerless … to prevent 
all further disclosures by the [G]overnment” of secret grand 
jury information simply because that information had already 
been made public.  Id. at 154.  We noted that “[e]ven if the 
dissemination by members of the public continues, the order 
barring further disclosure of any secret grand jury material 
will at least narrow that dissemination.”  Id. at 155.  This 
aspect of Smith is easily distinguished by the type of 
information disclosed (not to mention the changes in internet 
technology since the opinion issued, making it much less 
likely that resealing documents on a Government website will 
lessen their dissemination).  Simply put, courts have a 
different — and significantly greater — institutional interest 
in preserving the integrity of the grand jury process than they 
do in protecting the information of private litigants.  As this is 
a typical civil litigation involving private parties in which all 
of the documents at issue are already public, no such 
institutional interest is at stake here. 
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multi-district litigation.  Id. at 110 n.1.  The Scoliosis 
Research Society and Dr. Steven M. Mardjetko filed a motion 
to stay any public disclosure of the data, but the District Court 
denied the motion and authorized the plaintiffs to file the data 
in a public comment with the FDA.  Id. at 110-11.  We held 
that “[b]ecause that disclosure cannot now be undone, we will 
dismiss the appeal … as moot.”  Id. at 111.  Public disclosure 
cannot be undone because, as the Second Circuit has 
explained in similar circumstances, “[w]e simply do not have 
the power, even were we of the mind to use it if we had, to 
make what has thus become public private again.”  Gambale 
v. Deutsche Bank AG, 377 F.3d 133, 144 (2d Cir. 2004); see 
also Doe No. 1 v. Reed, 697 F.3d 1235, 1238-1240 (9th Cir. 
2012). 
 In light of the extensive publicity surrounding Cosby’s 
admissions, we are similarly without power to affect the 
dissemination of the unsealed documents’ contents in any 
meaningful way.  Five prominent news organizations 
published articles about the documents within hours of the 
District Court’s order, and the news media have repeated his 
damaging admissions countless times since then.  Apart from 
the traditional press, a Google search for “Bill Cosby 
deposition testimony” yields as of August 12, 2016, 81,200 
results, some of which include full copies of the documents 
bearing the District Court’s PACER imprint.  See, e.g., Diana 
Moskovitz, Here Are The Documents Bill Cosby Didn’t Want 
You to Read, Deadspin.com, (Jul. 6, 2015 6:42 PM), 
http://deadspin.com/here-are-the-documents-bill-cosby-didnt-
want-you-to-rea-1716083975 (linking to full library of the 
documents).  While these are not technically official records, 
“[i]f anyone with an internet connection can easily obtain 
images of the original documents online, it is not clear why 
anyone would bother filing an additional public records 
request.”  Doe No. 1, 697 F.3d at 1239.  In short, when it 
comes to public awareness of the documents’ contents, the 
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feathers of the pillow are scattered to the winds; nearly 
everyone in America (and many more around the world) with 
access to a computer either know what Cosby has admitted to 
doing or could find out with a few clicks, and this will remain 
true even if we order the documents resealed. 
 Any effect that resealing the documents might have on 
the numerous other legal proceedings that result from sexual 
assault allegations against Cosby (or might occur in the 
future) is simply not enough to present a live controversy in 
this appeal.  Cosby argues that resealing the documents would 
leave him “better positioned” to persuade “the various courts 
in which he finds himself a party” to limit the use of the 
documents in the proceedings before them.  Reply Br. at 1-2.  
In particular, he asserts that he could persuade these courts 
that the documents are inadmissible and cannot otherwise be 
used against him.  Id. 
 This argument is fatally flawed.  We held in In re 
Cantwell, 639 F.2d 1050 (3d Cir. 1981), that an appeal 
seeking “a ‘firm basis’” to seek relief from another court “[i]n 
effect … ask[s] us to issue an advisory opinion, something we 
may not do.”  Id. at 1054.  As advisory opinions are forbidden 
by Article III’s requirement of a live controversy, the 
Cantwell Court concluded that the appeal before it was moot.  
See id.  Given that Cosby expressly requests us to provide a 
basis to make an argument to other courts, he also requests an 
advisory opinion.  Moreover, even if we could issue such an 
opinion, Cosby cites no authority to the effect that sealing 
documents in a civil case would render them inadmissible in 
another litigation—indeed, sealed documents are often 
admitted into evidence.  See, e.g., United States v. Alexander, 
901 F.2d 272, 273-74 (2d Cir. 1990) (per curiam).  Hence this 
argument is also too speculative to present us with a live 
controversy. 
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 While Cosby cites several cases in which the 
possibility of an injunction limiting the future use of evidence 
obtained through grand jury proceedings was sufficient to 
defeat mootness — see In re Grand Jury Investigation, 445 
F.3d 266 (3d Cir. 2006); Gluck v. United States, 771 F.2d 750 
(3d Cir. 1985); Matter of Special March 1981 Grand Jury, 
753 F.2d 575 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v. Nix, 21 F.3d 
347 (9th Cir. 1994) — these cases do not give us any basis to 
meddle in the other proceedings involving sexual assault 
allegations against Cosby.  Under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 65(d)(2), a federal court’s power to order that a 
binding injunction issue is limited to certain persons 
connected to the case before it: 
(A) the parties; 
(B) the parties’ officers, agents, servants, 
employees and attorneys; and 
(C) other persons who are in active concert or 
participation with anyone described in 
[subsections] (A) or (B). 
As each of the cited cases concerned the possibility of an 
injunction against either the Government as a party to the 
grand jury proceedings or those who had received grand jury 
materials from the Government, there was no reason to doubt 
the court’s power to order such an injunction under Rule 
65(d)(2).  In this appeal, however, Cosby has not identified 
whom he would seek to enjoin, and to the extent that he 
suggests it would be his adversaries in other cases, they are 
not parties to this litigation and Cosby does not allege that 
they are acting in concert with any party.7  We thus have no 
                                              
 7 Although Beth Ferrier and Rebecca Cooper, two 
plaintiffs against Cosby in another case, moved to intervene 
in the proceedings regarding alleged breach of the settlement 
14 
 
basis to conclude that that there is any “potential availability 
of a future-use injunction” to save this appeal from mootness.  
See In re Grand Jury Investigation, 445 F.3d at 273. 
 We have considered Cosby’s remaining arguments 
against mootness and find them unpersuasive.  We cannot 
issue an advisory opinion simply to “make clear” to the news 
media that the District Court’s order does not entitle them to 
access any documents beyond those already unsealed.  Reply 
Br. at 4.  Similarly, even assuming that resealing the 
documents would enable Cosby to file the settlement 
agreement under seal in support of his claim that Constand 
breached it, he stipulated to dismissal of that claim for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction.  Though the dismissal was without 
prejudice, any prospect of relief in that proceeding is entirely 
an imaginative guess.  We therefore conclude that resealing 
the documents would not provide Cosby with any meaningful 
relief, and thus this appeal is moot. 
III. WHETHER TO VACATE THE DISTRICT 
COURT’S ORDER 
 As this appeal is moot, we cannot review the merits of 
the District Court’s decision to unseal the documents and 
must decide what course is appropriate.  We have equitable 
discretion to vacate the District Court’s order, Old Bridge 
Owners Co-op Corp. v. Township of Old Bridge, 246 F.3d 
310, 314 (3d Cir. 2001), which would prevent its decision 
from “spawning any legal consequences.”  Rendell v. 
Rumsfeld, 484 F.3d 236, 243 (3d Cir. 2007) (internal 
                                                                                                     
agreement, Cosby’s description of them as “non-parties” is 
apt.  Opp. to Mot. to Dismiss at 8.  They did not become 
parties, as the District Court denied their motion to intervene.  
See Order, ECF No. 128 (Dec. 21, 2015). 
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quotation marks omitted).  As a general rule, “when a case 
becomes moot pending disposition of an appeal, the judgment 
below will be vacated.”  Old Bridge, 246 F.3d at 314 (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  This is done out of concern for 
procedural fairness, namely that parties should not remain 
bound by a decision that the court of appeals cannot review 
because it has become moot.  See U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. 
Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18, 25 (1994). 
 The only recognized exception to this rule is when 
“mootness results from settlement” and thus “the losing party 
has voluntarily forfeited his legal remedy.”  Lightner ex rel. 
N.L.R.B. v. 1621 Route 22 West Operating Co., 729 F.3d 235, 
237-38 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Bancorp, 513 U.S. at 25).   
Refusing to vacate in those circumstances prevents parties 
from attempting to “manipulate the [judicial] system” by 
settling the case in order to vacate an unfavorable decision.  
Rendell, 484 F.3d at 243.   
 Although the claims of the AP are not settled, it 
nonetheless contends that Cosby forfeited his right to appeal 
by failing to make a timely motion to stay the District Court’s 
order.  While the Tenth Circuit and the D.C. Circuit have 
declined to vacate when the losing party has made no attempt 
whatsoever to seek a stay — see Mahoney v. Bobbitt, 113 
F.3d 219 (D.C. Cir. 1997); In re Western Pacific Airlines, 181 
F.3d 1191 (10th Cir. 1999) — that is not what happened here.  
Cosby’s counsel requested a stay within an hour of receiving 
the District Court’s order, and while this proved to be too late 
to prevent the documents from becoming public, there is 
certainly no evidence that it was part of any attempt to 
manipulate the judicial system.   
 Though we follow the general rule and vacate the 
District Court’s order, we point out that our decision does not 
express any view on whether the documents should have been 
16 
 
unsealed.  That question implicates how to balance significant 
public and private interests, and we leave the problem of 
striking that balance for another day.8  Our decision merely 
recognizes the limits of our own power in this case.  The 
contents of the documents are a matter of public knowledge, 
and we cannot pretend that we could change that fact by 
ordering them resealed.  We thus vacate the District Court’s 
order and dismiss this appeal as moot. 
                                              
8 While we are without jurisdiction to review this question, it 
is worth noting that, if we could review it, we would have 
serious reservations about the District Court’s “public 
moralist” rationale.  It has no basis in our jurisprudence 
regarding the conditions for modifying a protective order as 
set forth in Pansy and its progeny.  Moreover, the term 
“public moralist” is vague and undefined. 
